S'iJ^pt^^B.^ 


€1)0  Concept  ^^urpose 


A    PHILOSOPHICAL    THESIS 


by  the 
REV.    ORROK    COLLOQUE,    Ph.D. 


LIMITED    EDITION 


1  >  J ' 


NEW   YORK 

Fourth  Ave.  and  Twenty-Second  St. 
1904 


PSVCH. 
LIBRARV 


Q^cIk 


Accepted  in  partial  fulfillment  of  the 
requirements  for  the  Degree  of  Doctor 
of  Philosophy,  by  the  Graduate  School 
of  New  York  University,  in  190 4-. 


21)6240 


CONTENTS 


PART    I 
THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  GROUND 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.    Purpose  and  the  Volitional  Activity       ....  3 

II.    Definition 15 

III.    The  Purposes  of  Men 20 


PART    II 
THE  COSMOLOGICAL  APPLICATION 

IV.    On  Method 27 

V.    The  Purposes  of  Beasts 30 

VI.    Purpose  in  Inorganic  Nature 36 

VII.    The  Purpose  of  Organic  Nature 49 

Bibliography     . 56 


PART  I 

THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  GROUND 


THE  CONCEPT  PURPOSE 


CHAPTER  I 

PURPOSE   AND  THE   VOLITIONAL   ACTIVITY 

In  the  unity  of  consciousness,  we  find  the  intel- 
lectual side  of  life  and  the  volitional  side  of  Hfe  very 
closely  bound  up  together.  We  never  find  in  expe- 
rience either  the  intellectual  or  the  volitional  elements 
independent  and  alone.  In  psychology  we  find  neu- 
roses and  psychoses  inevitably  linked  together;  and  if 
we  examine  ideas,  and  try  to  determine  their  nature, 
we  again  find  the  intellectual  and  the  volitional  closely 
intertwined.  Both  are  imited  in  a  single  conscious- 
ness. According  to  the  philosophy  of  Locke,  ideas  are 
the  objects  of  thought.  Locke's  definitions  of  "  Idea  '* 
are  as  follows:  An  idea  is  "whatsoever  is  the  object 
of  the  understanding,  when  a  man  thinks"  .  .  .  "what- 
ever it  is  which  the  mind  can  be  employed  about  in 
thinking."  Ideas  are  the  material  with  which  the  mind 
works.  They  are  obtained  wholly  from  experience. 
They  come  into  the  mind  as  the  results,  the  effects, 
produced  through  the  means  of  sensation.  These  ideas, 
coming  from  and  given  through  sensation,  are  again 
the  objects  of  the  operations  of  the  Mind,  which,  as 
an  independent  and  active  agent,  unites  and  combines 

3 


THE    CONCEPT    PURPOSE 

these  ideas  from  sensation,  and  hence  there  comes  to 
be  a  second  class  of  ideas — the  ideas  from  Reflection. 
Knowledge  arises  from  both  these  sources,  which  to- 
gether form  experience.  Hence  all  our  knowledge  is 
about  ideas,  and  ideas  only  are  known  by  the  mind. 

But  this  position,  inasmuch  as  it  does  not  cover  all  the 
facts,  is  unsatisfactory.  In  that  reflection  is  an  active 
process  of  the  mind,  acting  upon  the  ideas  of  perception 
and  producing  other  ideas;  the  ideas  show  evidences  of 
an  activity  of  the  mind  which  has  not  yet  been  taken 
into  consideration.  The  activity  of  the  mind  is  a  fun- 
damental thought  with  Kant.  The  problem  between 
Nominalism  and  Conceptualism  does  not  exist  for  him. 
The  mind  cannot  think  perceptions  directly,  imme- 
diately. No  sooner  are  percepts  received  than  they  are 
classed  under  concepts,  and  must  be  thought  through 
concepts.  But  the  mind  can  think  concepts  directly, 
without  the  intervention  of  any  further  idea.  The 
reason  transforms  and  synthesizes  ideas,  in  accordance 
with  the  forms  and  categories,  because  it  is  the  very 
nature  and  constitution  of  the  mind  to  do  this  very 
thing.  An  a  priori  philosophy  goes  beyond  the  given, 
and  transcends  experience. 

There  is  no  possibility  of  an  idea  that  is  purely  in- 
tellectual, and  has  no  other  aspect.  Every  idea  is  as 
much  a  volitional  process,  or  rather  gives  evidence  of 
a  distinct  volitional  activity,  as  it  is  an  intellectual 
datum.  As  the  volitional  character  and  the  intellectual 
character  are  both  to  be  found  displayed  in  ideas,  we 
know  them  to  be  purposive,  id  est,  they  express  or  give 
evidence  of  a  purpose.  This  is  embodied  in,  or  ex- 
pressed by,  the  idea  and  is  a  principle  characteristic  of 

4 


PURPOSE   AND  VOLITIONAL   ACTIVITY 

an  idea.  It  is  in  the  ideas  we  find  evidences  of  pur- 
poses which  have  been  acting  upon  them  or  through 
them,  altering  their  character,  making  of  diverse  ideas 
homogeneous  units,  and  giving  them  the  character  of 
purposive  ideas.  Purposes  are  not  the  product  of 
ideas,  neither  are  ideas  the  product  of  pui-poses.  But 
the  sources  of  the  purposes  must  be  sought  not  in  pre- 
cepts or  concepts,  but  by  reference  to  the  Will. 

This  attitude  is  opposed  to  that  of  Royce,  when  he 
says,  "  Ideas  first  voluntarily  bind  themselves  to  a 
given  task — the  internal  purpose  is  selective — the  idea 
learns  to  develop  its  internal  meaning  so  as  to  assign 
to  itself  a  specific  purpose — the  idea  selects  its  object 
— the  idea  is  selective.  It  seeks  its  own.  It  attends 
as  itself  has  chosen.  It  desires  in  its  own  way — the 
idea's  own  conscious  purpose  or  will,"^  et  al.  This 
seems  to  mean  that  each  idea  possesses  all  the  charac- 
teristics and  powers  of  a  complete  and  separate  human 
mind,  possessing  the  ability  to  choose,  will,  plan  and 
execute.     Such  ideas  are  hypostasized. 

"  The  will  is  a  kind  of  causality  belonging  to  living 
beings,  in  so  far  as  they  are  rational,"  says  Kant.^  If 
a  will  acted  without  regard  to  an  intellect,  it  would  be 
blind.  But  in  all  our  experience,  we  can  never  find 
evidence  of  a  blind,  an  abstract  will.  "Tendency  is 
only  the  empty  form  of  the  will  .  .  .  and  as  every 
empty  form  is  only  an  abstraction,  voHtion  is  ex- 
istential or  actual  only  in  its  relation  to  the  repre- 
sentation of  a  present  or  future  state.  No  one  can 
really  will  purely  and  simply,  without  willing  this  or 

^  Royce  :   The  World  and  the  Individual. 
^  Kant :  Practical  Reason. 

5 


THE    CONCEPT    PURPOSE 

that.  A  will  that  does  not  will  something  is  nothing. 
It  is  only  by  the  determination  of  its  content  that  the 
will  acquires  the  possibility  of  existence,  and  this  con- 
tent is  representation.  Thus,  then,  there  is  no  will 
without  representation,  as  Aristotle  had  said  before: 
opeKTiKov  Se  ovK  avev  (f)aPTa(Tia<s  (De  An.  Ill,  30).  '^ 
What  we  know  is  always  and  only  an  intelligent  will, 
acting  pui'posively.  It  is  not  independent  of  all  in- 
fluence. It  can  be  trained  and  developed,  or  it  can  be 
debased  and  weakened.  It  increases  in  power  by  its 
activity,  and  decreases  by  failure  to  exert  its  power. 
It  can  be  guided  by  ideas — that  is,  by  whatever  ideas 
it  itself  chooses,  first  to  attend  to  and  admit  into  con- 
sideration, then  to  permit  to  exeii;  an  influence  upon  its 
own  autonomy,  its  own  self-determination,  and  thus 
ideas  do  in  a  sense  determine  the  will.  V  The  voluntary 
com'se  of  action  pursued  by  one  man  diff*ers  from  that 
of  another  as  greatly  as  the  ideas  of  one  man  difl'er 
from  those  of  another.  But  yet,  while  the  intellect  and 
the  will  may  influence  each  other,  and  may  be  very 
closely  united  in  a  single  consciousness,  it  is  the  will 
that  determines  the  course  of  action.  One  is  able  to 
select  by  an  act  of  will  upon  what  he  will  fix  his  atten- 
tion, what  ideas  he  will  entertain.  "We  do  not  indeed 
say,  our  will  causes  our  ideas,"  though  it  selects  among 
them,  "but  we  do  say,  our  ideas  now  (imperfectly)  em- 
body our  will."^  The  will  gives  the  character  of  pur- 
posiveness,  the  ability  to  reveal  the  purposes  which  they 
embody.  The  purpose  as  thus  revealed,  is  not  itself 
active  and  causal.     It  defines  or  determines;  but  for 

^  Hartmann  :    Philosophic  des  Unbewussten. 
2  Royce  :  The  World  and  the  Individual. 

6 


PURPOSE   AND   VOLITIONAL   ACTIVITY 

the  explanation,  it  is  necessary  to  refer  to  the  will 
itself  as  the  cause. 

The  philosophy  of  Fichte  may  be  very  far  from  a 
complete  and  all-embracing  system  of  metaphysics,  and 
especially  in  the  more  minute  ramifications  of  the  de- 
duction, may  be  far  from  finding  its  verification  in  ex- 
perience.    But  the  "  Wissenschaftslehre  "  may  be  con- 
sidered as  an  analysis  of  consciousness  with  respect  to 
the  point  of  departure  which  Fichte  adopts.     In  search- 
ing for  the  first  fundamental  principle,  recourse  must 
be  had  at  once  to  experience.      In  every  perception, 
there    are    present   both    intelHgence    and    its    object. 
There  can  be  no  subject  without  an  object,  nor  an  ob- 
ject without  a  subject.      The  empirical  basis  must  be 
assumed,  taken  for  granted,  posited,  in  order  that  there 
may  be  any  starting-place  at  all.     This,  then,  being 
given  and  granted,  abstraction  leads  us  from  the  em- 
pirical facts  of  consciousness  to  that  which  cannot  be 
an  object  of  thought  in  experience,  but  which  is  the 
very  ground  of  the  possibility  of  thought.      From  a 
proposition  universally  true  of  consciousness,  we  are 
led  to  that  in  which  the  relation  between  the  terms  and 
the  terms  themselves  exists,  and  which  is  conscious  of 
them,  the  Ego,  which  really  exists,  and  which  is  present 
in  every  possible  fact  of  consciousness,  as  the  unifying 
and  relating  principle.     Above  all  things,  this  Ego  is 
active;  for  to  relate  is  an  activity,  and  thinking  is  active 
and  free. 

In  his  life,  Fichte  had  had  abundant  opportunity 
to  test  the  power  of  his  will,  and  he  had  come  to  rely 
upon  it  to  such  an  extent,  that  he  made  it  the  supreme 
principle,  to  which  all  else  should  be  subordinated.     He 

7 


THE    CONCEPT    PURPOSE 

has  emphasized  this  aspect  of  consciousness,  that  the 
will  is  causal. 

In  order  to  discover  wherein  willing  lies,  we  must 
ask  each  one  to  examine  and  analyze  his  own  conscious 
experience.  No  definitions  will  make  the  activities  of 
the  will  plainer,  for  they  are  common  to  all  conscious- 
nesses. Yet  they  cannot  be  found  as  pure  activities, 
but  in  their  very  nature  as  voluntary,  distinguished 
from  involuntary  reflexes,  are  always  found  in  relation 
to  ideas.  Willing  is  found  in  acting  and  doing,  enter- 
ing the  whole  mental  life  in  a  far  from  simple  man- 
ner. "  The  point  to  which  the  will  is  applied  is  always 
an  idea.'"  We  discover  this  activity  in  our  use  of  ideas, 
or  in  our  realization  of  ideas  in  their  final  fulfilment, 
or  satisfaction  by  union  with  their  "  other." 

"  What  we  will  is  dependent  upon  what  we  think."^ 
The  point  of  focus  for  willing  is  the  idea.  We  can 
conceive  of  no  willing  without  some  form  of  ideation 
present,  and  these  ideas  must  be  presented  in  conscious- 
ness, through  perception,  experience.  "And  what  we 
think  is  subordinated  to  a  comprehensive  and  steadfast 
will."^  Munsterberg's  position,^  that  there  is  a  priority 
of  the  idea  to  the  volitional  activity,  would  seem  to  be 
true,  if  we  illustrate  it  in  this  manner:  Prenatal  move- 
ment is  not  volitional,  but  instinctive.  At  birth,  the 
sense-impressions  of  light,  etc.,  rapidly  give  rise  to 
many  percepts,  which  are  almost  at  once  combined  into 
concepts.     Because  of  the  ideas  thus  arising,  there  is, 

^  James  :  Psychology,  B.  C,  Chapter  XXIII. 
^  Ibid. 

3  Ladd  :  Outlines  of  Descriptive  Psychology,  Chapter  XVII. 
*  Grundziige  der  Psychologie. 

8 


PURPOSE   AND  VOLITIONAL   ACTIVITY 

first,  reflexive  movement,  to  answer  the  stimuli,  but 
soon  there  is  also,  on  the  basis  of  ideas  thus  obtained 
the  development  of  volitional  activity;  and  movement 
is  excited  not  only  as  a  reflex,  but  also  as  the  effect 
of  desire,  of  definite  volition.  The  will  is  already  at 
work  almost  as  soon  as  there  are  ideas,  and  then  pur- 
poses are  formed  and  executed.  And  Berkeley  says, 
"A  Spirit  (Mind)  is  one  simple,  undivided,  active  be- 
ing ...  as  it  perceives  ideas  it  is  called  the  un- 
derstanding, and  as  it  produces  or  otherwise  operates 
about  them  it  is  called  the  Wifl."  "  I  find  I  can  excite 
ideas  in  my  mind  at  pleasure,  and  vary  and  shift  the 
scene  as  often  as  I  think  fit.  It  is  no  more  than  wiU- 
ing,  and  straightway  this  or  that  idea  arises  in  my 
fancy;  and  by  the  same  power  it  is  obliterated  and 
makes  way  for  another.  This  making  and  unmaking 
of  ideas  doth  very  properly  denominate  the  mind  active. 
Thus  much  is  certain  and  grounded  on  experience ;  but 
when  we  talk  of  unthinking  agents,  or  of  exciting 
ideas  exclusive  of  Volition,  we  only  amuse  ourselves  with 
words."  "  The  ideas  actually  perceived  by  Sense  have 
not  a  like  dependence  on  my  will."^  But  I  can  open 
my  eyes  to  receive  them  or  not,  as  I  choose.  I  can  ap- 
propriate or  exclude  the  ideas  from  sensation.  And 
this  fact,  in  experience  gives  evidence  of  the  vohtional 
activity. 

The  will,  then,  is  causal,  and  can  initiate  a  new 
causal  series.  Whether  we  look  for  the  cause  in  a  boat 
or  a  book,  we  return  to  a  primary  volitional  element. 
The  lumber  is  sawn  and  bent  by  the  strength  of  a  man 
whose  every  move  is  determined  by  his  causal  will,  or 

1  Berkeley  :  Principles,  §§  27,  28,  and  29. 

9 


THE    CONCEPT    PURPOSE 

the  argument  of  the  book  follows  a  course  which  has 
been  previously  determined  upon  by  a  will.  The  pur- 
pose involved  in  either  case  is  the  result  of  the  action 
of  the  will  choosing  among  the  various  ideas.  The  will 
has  thus  foraiulated  and  embodied  a  purpose,  and  has 
unified  the  ideas  in  this  purpose  and  made  them  serve 
the  end  which  it  has  chosen  as  its  goal.  It  is  by  our 
own  volition  that  we  express  our  ideas  in  acts,  and  we 
say,  "  I  act,  or  I  will.  I  am  determined  only  by  the 
ideas  which  I  have  often  before  chosen  as  my  guides. 
I  am  responsible  for  my  actions."^  Thus  the  Ego,  as 
an  originating  activity,  is  a  cause,  an  initiating  or  first 
cause,  of  which  the  effects  are  both  mental  and  physi- 
cal. I  choose,  and  there  results  in  the  world  a  new 
causal  series  which  changes  not  only  the  course  of  my 
own  life,  but  the  whole  course  of  the  world  subse- 
quently. When  a  crime  is  committed,  not  only  does 
each  one  demand,  "Who  did  this?  "  but  society  at  large 
requires  an  answer,  and  places  the  responsibility  upon 
the  criminal.  It  is  the  result  of  an  act  of  will,  and 
an  act  implies  an  agent.  The  civil  law  holds  the  crim- 
inal, and  judges  him  as  alone  responsible  for  the  act 
which  has  altered  the  smooth-flowing  course  of  the  river, 
and  detrimentally  changed  the  facts  and  originated  a 
new  causal  series.  The  historical  variations  from  this 
rule  are  to  be  accounted  for  on  the  same  basis.  That 
the  Greeks  solemnly  tried  and  condemned  to  exile  the 
knife  with  which  a  murder  was  committed  was  due  to 
the  fact  that  the  Greeks  had  a  strong  tendency  to  per- 
sonify inanimate  objects;  and  as  persons  they  were  re- 
sponsible agents. 

*Ladd  :  Outlines  of  Descriptive  Psychology,  Chapter  XVII. 

10 


PURPOSE   AND  VOLITIONAL   ACTIVITY 

It  is  immediately  in  the  causal  activity  of  the  will 
that  we  define  oiu*  examples  of  purpose  first  displayed. 
Whenever  we  define  a  problem  or  isolate  any  question 
for  the  purpose  of  inquiry,  when  we  judge  of  what  is 
necessary  for  the  solution  of  any  problem,  we  imme- 
diately find  that  it  is  through  the  use  of  the  concept 
purpose  as  a  determining  factor.  In  all  our  thinking 
we  find  it  manifested.  We  can  control  our  course  of 
thinking.  We  select  our  ideas.  With  every  conscious 
movement  we  have  interposed  between  the  desire  to 
move  and  the  idea,  and  the  movement  accomplished,  an 
act  of  willing  which  is  unique. 

As  our  percepts  become  in  time  generalized  under 
concepts,  so  on  the  basis  of  our  ideas,  voluntarily  chosen, 
we  erect  what  we  call  ideals.  These  ideals  we  set  be- 
fore our  minds  as  goals.  They  are  to  be  realized,  and 
this  calls  for  conscious,  voluntary  action.  In  this  way 
the  will  places  before  the  mind  an  ideal  which  is  yet  to 
be  fulfilled,  and  it  purposes  a  fulfilment  in  the  end,  the 
reahty.  Hence  we  may  define  an  ideal  as  the  expres- 
sion of  a  purpose  as  presented  before  the  mind,  and  a 
real  thing  is  the  concrete  result,  fulfilment,  satisfaction, 
embodiment  of  the  ideal  in  the  outer  world.  It  de- 
pends on  the  character  of  the  ideal  whether  the  object  is 
a  partial  and  incomplete  or  a  whole  and  complete  real- 
ization of  the  ideal.  Both  the  ideal  and  the  real  give 
evidence  of  the  presence  of  both  elements  of  the  mind 
— the  intellectual  and  the  volitional.  But  while  it  is 
true  that  the  mind  can  be  the  som-ce  of  many  new 
causal  series,  it  is  also  true  that  free  will  is  not  exer- 
cised at  the  expense  of  the  laws  of  nature,  and  cannot 
change  the  essential  conditions  of  the  actual  combina- 

11 


THE    CONCEPT    PURPOSE 

tion;  it  only  shows  itself  in  the  very  sphere  of  these 
conditions.  It  uses  the  limits  set  to  its  activity  by  the 
laws  and  the  constitution  of  nature  as  the  steps,  the 
means  by  which  it  works  its  own  effects.  To  go 
against  these  is  ruin.  Fire  may  warm  or  it  may  de- 
stroy. Men  can  use  fire  in  their  mechanical  arts,  but 
they  cannot  stay  the  burning  of  a  forest. 

In  the  highest  forms  of  volition  we  notice,  first,  a 
choice  of  ends  and  the  fixing  of  one  before  the  mind, 
with  more  or  less  clearness  and  persistence.  Then  the 
desire  for  its  accomplishment  must  oust  and  defeat  other 
conflicting  desires.  The  selection  of  the  means  to  be 
used  in  the  accomplishment  of  the  end  requires  their 
deliberation,  and  a  comparative  weighing  of  values. 
Choice  of  ideas,  of  means,  is  itself  of  a  voluntary  char- 
acter. Then  deliberation  is  cut  short  by  the  "  fiat  of 
the  will,"  and  the  choice  is  made.  The  executive  voli- 
tion, the  will  to  act,  leads  directly  to  the  carrying  out 
of  the  purpose.  The  fact  that  I  have  decided,  that  I 
have  chosen,  is  an  ultimate  fact  of  experience. 

After  this  the  execution  may  be  more  or  less  auto- 
matic and  involuntary.  But  even  so,  it  must  at  least 
be  referred  to  previous  will-acts.  A  man  may  dress  au- 
tomatically, but  the  child  has  difficulty  in  learning  how 
to  dress.  The  pianist  has  learned  through  many  sep- 
arate acts  of  the  will  how  to  control  his  fingers.  His 
accustomed  control  shows  a  high  form  of  developed 
will-activity.  This  is  not  automatic  and  involuntary 
in  its  origin,  at  least.  The  resistance  of  the  fingers  is 
brought  under  the  will-control  so  thoroughly  that  the 
action  of  the  will  is  directly  carried  into  execution,  with- 
out the  need  of  overcoming  an  inhibition  or  a  physical 

12 


PURPOSE   AND   VOLITIONAL   ACTIVITY 

stiffness,  and  so  the  response,  because  it  is  easier,  is 
called  automatic.  Again,  "  the  case  of  the  old  curate, 
who  had  become  insane  and  who  used  to  recite  with  the 
utmost  eloquence  the  exordium  of  Father  Bribaine  "  in 
a  most  impressive  manner,  although  he  was  insane  even 
to  entire  imbecility,  is  still  an  example  of  purpose,  al- 
though it  is  not  to  be  referred  to  present,  but  to  past 
acts  or  habits  of  wilHng.  The  conscious  and  pur- 
posive action  by  volition  was  there  once,  although  now 
only  the  effect  may  remain. 

All  volitions  and  choices  are  more  or  less  purpose- 
ful actions.  A  purpose  embraces  both  means  and  end. 
A  purpose  cannot  exist  apart  from  or  independent  of 
a  will,  to  which  it  may  be  referred  as  an  effect  to  a 
cause.  Its  chief  characteristic  is  that  the  will  is  fixed 
steadily  upon  the  end  as  the  plan  is  executed,  and  con- 
trols every  step  of  the  progression.  The  degree  of 
success  is  dependent  upon  the  degree  of  this  fixity. 
When  applied  to  an  ideal  of  life  or  character,  which 
appears  unitary  owing  to  conscious  planning,  then  a 
man  is  called  "  far-sighted."  It  is  "  the  man  of  one 
idea,"  who  centres  his  hfe  in  one  purpose,  that  gains 
the  highest  degree  of  volitional  power.  In  the  con- 
struction of  ideals  we  may  set  before  ourselves  ideals 
that  not  only  have  never  been  realized,  but  which  may 
never  be  attainable. 

"  The  will  is  the  source,  the  origin  of  ideals,  and  also 
of  their  realization."^  In  the  pursuit  of  such  ideals, 
there  is  an  interesting  inhibitive  volition  that  is  no  less 
a  result  of  purposiveness  than  is  activity,  and  that  is, 
the  suppression  of  all  that  may  tend  to  interfere  with 

^  Dewey  :  Psychology,  Chapter  XVIII. 
13 


THE    CONCEPT   PURPOSE 

the  execution  of  the  purpose  and  the  attainment  of  the 
ideal  end.  This  is  the  development  of  the  will — in 
self-control,  the  checking  of  the  causal  activity  of  the 
will,  by  the  very  act  of  the  will  itself,  by  which  the 
power  to  will  is  increased,  and  the  ability  to  maintain 
the  ideal  before  the  mind  by  voluntary  activity  is 
strengthened.  The  only  really  efficacious  cause  that 
we  can  know  is  our  own  volitional  activity.  The  only 
purposes  that  are  immediately  perceptible  to  us,  are 
our  own  purposes,  formed  ideally  at  first  in  our  minds, 
and  later  actively  carried  into  effect.  We  know  the 
active  force  of  our  own  wills.  We  know  the  ideal,  the 
end,  or  the  plan  according  to  which  we  act,  and  that 
the  formation  of  the  plan  is  our  own  act.  This  much 
is  given  us  in  our  own  immediate  experience — and  no 
more. 


14 


CHAPTER   II 

DEFINITION 

I  SIT  in  the  window,  looking  out  over  the  Sound. 
I  have  seen  and  sailed  many  boats,  and  I  desire  to 
have  a  boat,  and  to  join  the  fleet  yonder.  I  get  a  piece 
of  paper  and  a  pencil,  and  I  lay  down  the  lines  of  a 
vessel,  and  make  specifications  for  the  lumber.  Then 
I  send  for  the  materials  with  which  to  work.  Putting 
aside  all  other  work  and  pleasure,  I  put  into  effect  the 
plan  I  have  conceived  and  laid  out  on  paper.  I  have 
chosen  the  end — the  boat,  now  an  ideal,  but  soon  to 
be  a  real  thing — and  I  have  selected  the  means  for  its 
fulfilment.  In  my  work  I  find  that  many  of  the  means 
that  I  have  selected  must  be  abandoned  and  new  devices 
substituted;  yet  the  end  I  keep  steadfastly  before  my 
mind.  Gradually  the  work  nears  completion.  The 
effect  of  days  of  labor  is  to  be  seen.  The  finishing 
touches  assume  an  exaggerated  magnitude.  And  at 
last  she  is  finished  and  launched,  and  the  desire  and 
the  ideas,  previously  gained  from  experience,  upon 
the  basis  of  which  the  will  acted  in  forming  first  the 
plan  in  the  mind  and  on  paper,  and  later  carried  them 
into  effect,  are  satisfied,  and  there  is  a  completed  pur- 
pose, which  in  its  fulfilment  is  a  Reality. 

By  an  analysis  of  this  illustration,  which  we  may 
make  to  stand  as  typical  of  all  om-  purposes,  we  may 
form  a  definition  of  what  a  Purpose  is.      There  are 

15 


THE    CONCEPT    PURPOSE 

many  parts,  means,  end,  miited  in  one,  hence  the  whole 
is  an  organism,  organum.  The  formation  of  a  plan 
or  purpose  in  the  mind  involves  the  action  of  the  will. 
And  then  this  plan,  sustained  by  the  will  before  the 
mind  determines  what  future  volitions  are  to  be  in 
order  to  carry  out  this  plan.  "  Volition  is  regulated, 
harmonized  impulse.  It  involves  a  double  process: 
first,  the  various  impulses  must  be  coordinated  with 
each  other;  secondly,  they  must  all  be  brought  into 
harmonious  relations  with  an  end,  must  be  subordi- 
nated to  one  principle,"^  and  must  form  an  organum. 
Consequently,  there  is  a  neccessary  connection  between 
each  of  the  elements  and  all  the  others.  This  is  not  a 
causal  connection.  One  means  does  not  cause  another, 
nor  do  any  or  all  of  the  means  cause  the  end.  And 
certainly  the  end  is  not  a  cause  of  the  means.  It 
cannot  be  a  "  causa  sui "  to  cause  itself,  and  so  self- 
explanatory.  Even  the  ideal  representation  of  the  end 
does  not  cause  either  the  means  or  the  real  end. 
Neither  the  plan  nor  the  purpose  is  in  any  stage  causal. 
It  is  not  a  "  causa  -finalisr  A  final  cause  is  used  to  ex- 
plain.  Purpose  is  not  an  explanatory  concept.  It 
only  defines,  as  is  the  case  with  the  other  philosophical 
concepts.  It  is  the  will-activity  that  initiates  a  new 
causal  series.  Here  is  the  great  confusion  of  Janet's 
"  Finales  Causes,"  that  it  does  not  distinguish  between 
a  Purpose  and  a  final  cause. 

Again:  Both  in  the  ideal  representation  of  a  pur- 
pose before  the  consciousness,  and  in  the  concrete  ex- 
ternal realization  afterwards  attained,  there  is  an  iden- 
tity between  each  means  and  the  end.     Thus  the  end 

^  Dewey :  Psychology. 

16 


DEFINITION 

may  be  considered  the  siun  of  all  the  means  which  have 
been  used  to  bring  it  about.  "  These  means,  how- 
ever, are  not  intrinsically  distinct  from  the  end.  They 
are  only  proximate  ends ;  they  are  the  end  analyzed  into 
its  constituent  factors.  For  example,  the  end  of  voli- 
tion is  the  construction  of  a  house.  The  means  are  the 
plans,  the  brick  and  mortar,  the  arrangement  of  these 
by  the  workmen,  etc.  It  is  evident  that  the  end  is  not 
something  intrinsically  different  from  the  means;  it  is 
the  means  taken  as  a  harmoniously  manifested  whole. 
The  means,  on  the  other  hand,  are  something  more  than 
precedents  to  an  end.  The  first  means,  the  plans,  are 
only  the  end  in  its  simplest,  most  elementary  form,  and 
the  next  means  are  an  expansion  of  this,  while  the  final 
means  are  identical  with  the  end.  "  When  we  look  at 
the  act  as  a  realized  whole,  we  call  it  end;  when  we 
look  at  it  in  process  of  realization,  partially  made  out, 
we  call  it  means.  But  the  action  of  the  intellect  is 
requisite  to  analyze  the  end,  the  whole,  into  its  means, 
the  component  factors."^  If  any  means  were  not  iden- 
tical with  the  end,  it  would  be  immediately  dropped 
out  of  consciousness  as  useless. 

As  the  means  become  realized,  there  is  an  accumula- 
tion of  effects,  a  cumulative  aspect.  Time  is  required, 
first,  to  form  the  purpose  in  the  mind  and  to  select  the 
means,  then  to  carry  out  the  purpose  and  bring  it  to 
a  realization.  The  purpose  must  be  worked  out  in 
time.  From  start  to  finish  the  purpose-forming  proc- 
ess is  carried  on  in  this  continuum.  The  whole  is  pres- 
ent continuously  in  consciousness.  *'  Volition,"  which 
forms  the  purpose  in  accordance  with  the  ideas  present 
^  Dewey  :  Psychology,  Chapter  XVIII. 

17 


THE    CONCEPT   PURPOSE 

in  consciousness,  "  is  impulse  consciously  directed  tow- 
ards the  attainment  of  a  recognized  end  .  .  .  which 
is  felt  as  desirable."^  Throughout  the  whole  there  is 
a  feeling  of  the  value  of  the  end — that  it  was  worth 
while  to  go  through  the  labor  and  privations  necessary 
to  attain  the  end.  "  A  volition  or  act  of  will  involves, 
therefore,  over  and  above  the  impulse,  knowledge  and 
feeling.  There  must  be  knowledge  of  the  end  of  ac- 
tion. There  must  be  knowledge  of  the  relations  of 
this  end  to  the  means  by  which  it  is  to  be  attained;  and 
this  end  must  awaken  a  pleasurable  or  painful  feeling 
in  the  mind.  It  must  possess  an  interesting  quality, 
or  be  felt  to  be  in  immediate  subjective  relation  to  the 
self.  The  impulses  furnish  the  moving  force  by  which 
the  end  whose  quality  is  recognized,  and  whose  necessity 
for  the  happiness  of  self  is  felt,  is  actually  brought 
about.  It  is  the  energy  which  furnishes  its  actual  ac- 
complishment, directed  along  the  channels  laid  down 
by  the  intellect  for  the  satisfaction  of  feeling."^  Even 
the  feeling  of  curiosity  may  be  an  incentive  to  the 
mind  to  exert  a  purposive  activity.  In  fact,  the  Feel- 
ings play  a  very  great  part  in  the  formation  and  execu- 
tion of  purposes,  and  are  in  no  wise  to  be  left  out  of 
account.  This  is  easily  seen  in  the  fine  arts,  where  the 
aesthetic  feelings  play  so  important  a  part.  Purpose, 
then,  may  be  used  in  two  senses — when  it  refers  to  a 
peculiar  characteristic  of  an  ideal  which  it  is  desired 
to  put  into  execution,  when  it  means  "  plan,"  plus  the 
striving  or  desire  to  make  the  ideal  real,  or  to  a  peculiar 
characteristic  exhibited  by  and  inlierent  in  the  real  ac- 

^  Dewey  :  Psychology,  Chapter  XVIII. 
» Ibid. 

18 


DEFINITION 

complishment  of  the  ideal  in  the  completed  fact.  Then 
the  fact  is  said  to  be  purposive.  The  boat  gives  evi- 
dence of  purpose,  i.e.,  (as  purpose  refers  to  a  conscious- 
ness), not  only  of  the  activity  of  physical  causes,  but 
also  of  the  use  of  these  physical  causes  (which  might 
explain,  but  could  not  fully  define,  the  existence  of  the 
boat),  by  an  active  mind. 

In  our  definition,  we  have  used  a  number  of  other 
concepts  which  are  wrapped  up  and  involved  inextri- 
cably with  the  concept  purpose.  Among  them,  the 
most  noticeable  are  these: 

The  Individual.  The  active  agent,  the  planks,  the 
tools,  the  various  means  employed,  the  end  realized,  the 
boat,  are  each  and  all  individuals,  and  are  as  such  to 
be  defined. 

The  Continuum.  The  plan  is  formed  in  the  con- 
tinuum consciousness  and  executed  in  time  ahd  space 
continua. 

Potentiality.  The  plan  must  be  feasible,  possible, 
else  it  would  not  be  formed.  If  a  device  is  found  im- 
possible, it  is  exchanged  for  a  plan  that  can  come  within 
the  concept  of  potentiality. 

Chance.  As  we  discuss  this  concept  later,  we 
merely  mention  it  here. 


19 


CHAPTER   III 

THE   PURPOSES   OF   MEN 

We  have  now  seen  what  sort  of  a  thing  purpose 
is  in  the  immediate  consciousness,  in  the  Ego,  in  me. 
How  can  I  extend  the  concept  to  a  wider  sphere?  I 
have  immediate  experience  of  it  in  my  own  conscious- 
ness, and  I  reason  from  the  causal  will  and  my  ideas, 
to  the  plan  and  its  execution  in  the  purpose,  showing 
volitional  activity.  How  do  I  know  of  others'  pur- 
poses? 

The  only  inunediate  object  presented  to  us  is  our- 
selves,— our  own  minds,  as  they  receive  passively,  or 
as  they  are  active  or  efficacious.  We  know  only  a 
single  individual.  We  cannot  proceed  as  anatomists, 
and  draw  our  conclusions  from  having  dissected  a  great 
number  of  individuals  from  the  species  we  are  study- 
ing. But  we  can  study  only  the  one  single  individual, 
and  from  the  conclusions  thus  derived,  we  must  reason 
concerning  other  individuals  of  the  same  sort.  We 
can  do  no  more  than  "  judge  others  by  ourselves,"  and 
"  ab  uno  disce  omnes."  But  this  is  sufficient.  Al- 
though other  men  differ  very  greatly  as  being  different 
individuals,  not  precisely  like  ourselves,  yet  we  may  and 
we  must  conclude  from  the  likeness  of  qualities  that 
we  see  to  the  likeness  of  qualities  that  are  hidden. 
"  Such  is  the  nature  of  Spirit,  or  that  which  acts,  that 
it  cannot  be  of  itself  perceived,  but  only  by  the  effects 

20 


THE    PURPOSES    OF    MEN 

which  it  produceth."^      This  process  is  an  induction, 
based  on  analogical  reasoning.     We  believe  in  the  in- 
telligence of  our  fellow-men,  but  that  belief  is  so  deep- 
seated  in  our  own  minds  that  it  amounts  to  certitude. 
We  are  as  certain  here  as  we  are  of  anything  that  is 
given  us,  either  in  sensation  or  reflection.     Indeed,  so 
far  as  I  know,  no  man  has  ever  questioned  the  intelli- 
gence of  other  men.     The  greatest  doubters  have  held 
this  belief  very  strongly,  as  is  shown  by  the  fact  that 
they  have   published   their  books   for  the   perusal   of 
others.     The  method  we  have  adopted  for  our  proce- 
dure is  justified  on  this  ground,  because  in  one  sense  it 
is  the  "  only  possible  "  way.     In  whatever  we  do,  in 
M^hatever  we  think,  there  is  always  the  "  personal  ele- 
ment."    We  can  never  work  otherwise.     There  is  al- 
ways present  the  Subjective  Ego,  with  all  its  peculiar 
characteristics,  desires,  choices,  preferences;  and  it  col- 
ors the  whole  work  of  every  man.      There  is  not  a 
philosopher  who  has  not  put  upon  his  work  the  stamp 
of  his   own   character,   mirrored   his   own   face   in   it, 
and  thereby  missed  the  "necessarily  and  universally 
vahd  "  philosophy  that  will  serve  as  well  for  one  man 
as  for  another.     There  has  never  been  an  independent 
and  absolute  system  made  by  man.     Whatever  is  uni- 
versally valid  finds  its  ground  in  the  source  to  which 
the  very  nature  and  constitution  of  man  himself  must 
be  referred.     The  reason  why  we  make  this  induction 
— that  other  men  have  minds  like  our  own — is  because 
we  see  in  their  actions  and  words  evidences  of  that  same 
activity  of  the  will,  planning  and  executing,  as  we  dis- 
cover or  experience  in  our  own.      Our  experience  of 

^  Berkeley:  Principles,  §  27. 
21 


THE    CONCEPT   PURPOSE 

other  men  leads  us  to  see  purpose  "  in  their  actions." 
These  actions  we  refer  to  the  causal  activity  of  a  pur- 
posive will  like  our  own. 

Let  us  take  our  former  illustration  of  the  boat. 
But  we  shall  find  it  necessary  to  turn  it  around,  end 
for  end.     We  see  the  boat-builder  engaged  over  his 
work,  selecting  the  proper  tools,  cutting,  choosing  and 
trimming  the  timbers,  making  fast  the  frames,  form- 
ing the  hull  of  a  boat.      We  never  for  a  moment 
imagine  that  here  there  is  at  work  a  blind  necessity,  or 
that  the  work  is  a  result  of  accident.     Here  are  effects 
giving  evidence  that  all  through  the  work  there  is  lim- 
ning the  characteristic  of  purposiveness,  that  the  builder 
is  realizing  a  purpose  which  he  has  in  his  mind,  and 
that  this  purpose  involves,  as  its  ground,  necessarily,  a 
will  and  a  mind.     It  is  because  of  the  element  of  Pur- 
pose that  we  can  thus  reason,  and  can  thus  affirm  the 
intelligence  of  other  men  as  an  indisputably  certain 
truth.     We  perform  the  same  process  of  reasoning  if, 
night  after  night,  when  the  builder  is  gone  home,  we 
drop  into  the  shop,  and  see  the  boat  nearing  completion, 
the  purpose  gradually  reaching  its  fulfilment  in  reahty. 
Although  we  do  not  see  the  workman  or  the  perform- 
ance of  the  work,  we  yet  know  that  he  who  does  this 
thing    is    an    intelligent,    willing,    planning,    purpose- 
forming  man.     The  work,  too,  has  all  the  character- 
istics of  Purpose, — of  any  one  of  our  own  purposive 
acts.     We  see  here  the  union  of  interdependent  parts, 
working  themselves  out  toward  a  completion  in  time, 
each  means   dependent   on   all  the   other   means,   the 
planking  on  the  frames,  and  the  frames  on  the  back- 
bone, and  we  see  these  means  all  adapted  for  and  iden- 

22 


THE   PURPOSES   OF   MEN 

tical  with  the  end.  We  see  the  necessary  connection 
involved  between  the  parts.  We  see  the  cumulative 
growth  toward  completion,  the  finished  boat,  and  we 
feel  the  value  of  the  end,  that  it  will  fulfil  its  function 
and  realize  the  purpose.  This  gradual,  regular,  or- 
dered growth  indicates  that  it  is  the  realization  of  an 
ideal,  that  back  of  it  all  lies  the  ideal,  the  plan,  toward 
which  the  work  is  progressing.  We  can  explain  every 
step  by  means  of  mechanical  laws,  every  movement  by 
gravity,  resistance,  force,  etc.;  but  all  would  be  mean- 
ingless were  it  not  that  in  the  whole  we  saw  the  activ- 
ity of  a  wilHng  agent,  i.e.,  that  the  plan  and  the  pur- 
pose which  we  see  in  the  work  were  present  before  a 
consciousness.  This  alone  gives  a  meaning  to  the  work. 
We  can  explain  (after  a  fashion)  by  the  mechanical 
causes,  but  we  need  more.  We  need,  in  order  to  de- 
fine, the  concept  of  Purpose,  and  the  presence  thereby 
involved  of  a  consciousness  other  than  our  own.  To 
quote  again  from  Berkeley:  "From  the  effects  I  see 
produced,  I  conclude  there  are  actions;  and  because  ac- 
tions, voHtions,  and  because  there  are  volitions,  there 
must  be  a  will.  .  .  .  But  will  and  understanding 
constitute  in  the  strictest  sense  a  mind  or  spirit."^ 
"  We  cannot  know  the  existence  of  other  spirits  "  (men) . 
The  motions  of  their  bodies  are  perceptible.  Their 
conscious  life  or  personality  is  necessarily  invisible. 
"  We  cannot  know  the  existence  of  other  spirits,  other- 
wise than  by  their  operations  or  the  ideas  by  them 
excited  in  us."  These  "  inform  me  there  are  cer- 
tain particular  agents,  like  myself,  which  accompany 
them  and  concur  in  their  production.    Hence  the  knowl- 

^  Berkeley  :  Third  Dialogue  between  Hylas  and  Philonous. 

23 


THE    CONCEPT    PURPOSE 

edge  I  have  of  other  spirits  is  not  immediate,  as  is  the 
knowledge  of  my  ideas;  but  depending  on  the  inter- 
vention of  our  ideas  (or  acts)  by  me  referred  to  agents 
or  spirits  distinct  from  myself,  as  effects  or  concomitant 
signs.  "^  This  is  a  pure  inference.  We  have  percep- 
tion in  our  minds.  We  can  infer  that  there  are  per- 
ceptions which  are  in  other  minds.  We  can  infer  minds, 
or  minds  plus  perceptions,  but  never  perceptions  or  ex- 
periences alone,  apart  from  a  mind.  But  having  made 
the  induction  from  what  we  can  observe  to  what  we 
must  conclude  to  be  the  ground  for  our  observations, 
we  determine  that  other  men  can  will  and  can  purpose. 
And  this  conclusion  gives  interest  and  meaning  to  all 
their  work. 

To  what  an  extent  does  the  Concept  of  Purpose 
enter  into  the  history  of  men  and  their  actions?  It 
gives  content  to  history  and  lends  interest  to  the  lives 
of  other  men  and  to  their  deeds.  It  is  the  men  of  ac- 
tivity, of  volitional  energy,  of  strong  pm-posiveness, 
who  have  moulded  the  lives  of  nations.  And  even  in 
a  much  humbler  sense,  in  the  Drama,  the  concept  Pur- 
pose is  seen  to  be  the  one  essential,  the  very  point  of 
focus.  The  history  of  dramatic  activity  shows  that  the 
energy  has  been  greatest  in  the  writing  of  plays  just 
after  times  of  struggle.  France  and  Germany  give 
the  best  examples.  The  life  of  the  drama  is  in  strug- 
gle, the  clash  of  will  against  will,  in  the  formation  and 
execution  of  a  Purpose  that  is  all-absorbing.  The  in- 
terest of  a  drama  lies  in  the  plot. 

^Berkeley:  Principles,  §  145. 


24 


PART  II 

THE   COSMOLOGICAL 
APPLICATION 


CHAPTER   IV 

ON   METHOD 

We  have  found  Purpose  manifested  in  oiu-  own 
personal  and  voluntary  experience.  We  have  also  es- 
tablished its  existence  in  other  men.  We  shall  now 
continue  by  descending  the  scale  of  life,  seeking  evi- 
dences of  purposiveness  in  the  lower  orders.  As  we 
descend,  we  shall  find  the  evidences  of  individual  pur- 
posiveness gradually  decreasing  and  the  evidences  for 
a  mechanical  explanation  gradually  increasing,  until  we 
find  ourselves  involved  in  the  "  riddle  of  the  universe." 
We  should,  I  thoroughly  believe,  remain  entangled  in 
this  mesh,  if  we  contented  ourselves  with  this  procedure 
alone — that  is,  the  descent  of  the  scale — and  did  not 
seek  the  evidences  of  purposiveness,  as  referring  to  and 
emanating  from  a  higher  source.  We  must  also  ascend 
again  to  a  higher  plane,  even  superior  to  the  purposes 
of  man,  seeking  the  ground  and  source,  the  intelligent 
and  willing  mind,  to  which  the  purposes  which  we  dis- 
cover can  and  must  be  referred,  if  we  are  to  escape 
from  this  "  riddle  of  the  universe,"  and  have  a  philo- 
sophical system  that  is  logical  and  explicable. 

Our  statements  with  regard  to  man's  will  regard  it 
as  free.  If  it  were  not,  we  could  not  look  to  man  for 
the  formation  and  execution  of  plans  and  the  realiza- 
tion of  ideals,  but  would  be  compelled  to  look  elsewhere 
for  a  definition  and  an  explanation  of  Purpose,  or  to 

27 


THE    CONCEPT    PURPOSE 

deny  its  existence  altogether.  But  man,  capable  as  he 
is,  is  not  absolutely  free  to  will  and  to  perform  whatever 
his  imagination  may  conceive.  He  is  not  omnipotent. 
He  is  bound  and  conditioned  in  many  ways.  He  can- 
not choose  what  ideas  he  is  to  receive  through  sensation 
and  experience.  He  meets  life  as  it  comes  to  him,  and 
must  make  the  best  of  it.  He  must  act  in  accord- 
ance with  the  laws  of  nature,  which  are  set  as  bounds, 
against  which  he  may  struggle  in  vain,  only  to  be  over- 
thrown at  the  last.  But  these  same  bounds  he  can  use, 
and  he  does  use  them  in  carrying  out  his  purposes.  In 
his  boat-building  he  works  in  accordance  with  the  laws 
of  gravity  and  resistance,  with  the  mechanical  laws,  and 
with  the  natural  properties  of  the  materials  with  which 
he  works.  He  acts  beyond  himself  on  nature  and  on 
bodies,  and  brings  into  the  universe  new  and  imending 
causal  series.  Things  that  would  otherwise  obey  the 
laws  of  nature  he  turns  into  new  courses.  He  hews 
down  the  trees  and  cuts  them  to  his  patterns,  and  works 
them  into  his  boat,  all  compatible  with  the  laws  of 
gravity  and  mechanics,  and  yet  in  every  instance  pre- 
determined by  the  mind.  And  yet  he  must  always  act 
imder  and  in  agreement  with  this  higher  law  which  is 
over  him  and  limits  him.  So  we  have  not  begim  at 
the  top.  We  must  go  higher  as  well  as  deeper.  We 
must  determine  what  this  other  something  is.  For  as 
we  descend  the  scale  we  find  that  the  purposiveness  of 
the  individuals  which  we  may  consider  is  steadily  de- 
creasing. There  is  less  and  less  intelligence,  less  voli- 
tional activity,  less  self-determination,  less  purposive- 
ness that  is  merely  personal  and  to  be  referred  to  the 
individual  in  question — id  est,  internal. 

28 


ON   METHOD 

It  is  not  now  generally  thought  that  there  are  such 
great  gaps  and  leaps  in  nature  as  Descartes'  paradox 
of  animal  machines  and  Kant's  animal  automata  seem 
to  imply.  The  beasts  have  not  the  capacity  to  reason 
and  to  execute  plans  that  man  has — the  trees  are  not 
able  to  cope  with  the  beasts,  and  a  stone  is  unchanged 
by  any  growth,  life  or  activity  within  it.  Each  is  pow- 
erless before  the  activity  of  the  higher  order,  and  the 
stone  is  entirely  under  the  dominion  of  laws  and  pur- 
poses which  are  wholly  outside  of  its  own  individual 
self,  and  which  must  consequently  be  referred  to  some- 
thing entirely  other  and  different  from  itself.  And  at 
the  same  time  there  is,  as  we  descend  the  scale,  the  stead- 
ily increasing  evidences  of  something  acting  purpos- 
ively,  which  supplies  the  evidences  of  purposes  in  a 
no  less  striking  way  than  they  appear  in  man's  activity. 
Man  has  a  will  of  his  own,  and  can  act  independently 
of  all  else  within  the  limits  of  his  own  possibilities. 
The  stone  has  no  self-determination.  In  man,  pur- 
poses are  first  to  be  referred  to  his  own  free  will.  In 
the  stone,  the  evidences  of  purposiveness  are  to  be 
referred  at  once  and  directly  to  something  else  outside 
itself — to  Nature,  that  wore  it  to  a  smooth  pebble;  to 
the  man,  who  fitted  it  into  the  wall  of  the  building ;  and 
in  the  end  we  shall  find  ourselves  obliged  to  refer  both 
the  man  and  the  stone,  because  they  are  both  condi- 
tioned, limited,  finite,  to  a  higher  and  more  powerful 
and  intelligent  purposive  mind,  to  whom  they  are  both 
materials  and  means. 


29 


CHAPTER  V 

THE   PURPOSES   OF   BEASTS 

Fro3I  the  likeness  of  one  man  to  others,  we  have 
argued  by  analogy  from  our  own  intelligence  to  intel- 
ligence in  other  men.  It  is  only  by  analogy  that  we 
can  pass  from  man  to  the  beasts  and  argue  for  their 
intelligence.  We  must  proceed  by  the  same  method 
— from  effects  to  causes. 

There  is  a  close  relationship  between  men  and  beasts. 
Consequently  either  both  are  automata  or  both  are  in- 
telligent. The  former  is  untenable  on  our  previous 
ground.     Is  there  any  evidence  for  the  latter? 

There  are  so  many  actions  in  beasts,  both  domesti- 
cated and  wild  (the  latter  are  the  more  certain  study  in 
this  regard,  because  the  domesticated  beasts,  by  imitation 
or  by  imputation,  often  acquire  the  habits  and  almost 
the  ideas  of  their  masters),  that  are  exactty  like  the 
actions  of  men,  that  it  is  quite  necessary  to  assign  them 
to  the  same  sources.  The  tiger  stalks  the  gazelle  and 
pounces  upon  it  unexpectedly.  The  hunter  trails  the 
tiger  and  slays  it  unsuspecting.  The  bear  or  the  squir- 
rel, when  trapped,  after  recovering  from  frantic  and 
futile  attempts  at  escape,  sits  down  to  think  over  its 
situation,  and,  trying  first  one  method  and  then  an- 
other, at  last  learns  the  secret  of  the  trap  and  regains 
its  liberty.  Having  once  learned  this  way  of  escape, 
it  tries  it  first  when  again  trapped.    There  is,  too,  a  great 

30 


THE    PURPOSES    OF    BEASTS 

difference  in  various  beasts  in  this  regard.  Some  are 
stupid  and  slow  of  wit.  Others  are  bright,  and  their 
cunning  shows  a  greater  degree  of  intelHgence.  The 
beast  desires  water  or  to  cross  a  river,  and  goes  about 
the  fulfilment  of  its  purpose  as  deliberately  and  with 
as  great  evidence  of  a  well-formed  plan  as  does  a  man. 
Monkeys  learn  to  cross  rivers  by  forming  a  living  chain. 
When  the  red  squirrels,  which  had  lately  migrated  into 
the  Eastern  States  from  Canada,  had  propagated  in 
great  numbers,  they  began  to  drive  the  older  inhab- 
itants, the  gray  squirrels,  from  their  homes.  The  gray 
squirrels,  though  larger,  were  unable  to  withstand  the 
fierce  little  red  squirrels,  and  found  it  necessary  to  mi- 
grate. They  moved  southwestward  in  large  numbers, 
and  reached  the  Mississippi  River.  Although  they  can 
swim  fairly  well,  their  strength  was  miequal  to  the  great 
breadth  of  the  river.  As  they  were  driven  from  be- 
hind, they  were  compelled  to  advance.  Many  met 
death  by  drowning,  but  often  it  was  possible  to  see  a 
squirrel  dislodging  a  piece  of  wood  from  one  shore,  and 
either  riding  upon  it  or  clinging  to  it,  take  his  chances  of 
reaching  the  other  bank.  The  most  remarkable  thing 
of  all  is  the  fact  that  the  squirrels  chose  their  place  of 
crossing,  where  the  current  was  close  to  the  eastern 
bank,  and  then  swung  over  to  the  other  shore;  and  they 
often  selected  a  time  when  the  wind  was  in  the  right 
direction  to  help  them  in  their  passage. 

Those  animal  characteristics  that  are  so  deeply  in- 
grained that  they  are  called  instincts,  are  greatly  al- 
tered or  quite  lost  by  change  of  locality,  climate  or 
environment,  because  the  beast  learns  that  the  previous 
methods  are  no  longer  useful,  while  other  needs  must  be 

31 


THE    CONCEPT    PURPOSE 

met,  and  the  readiness  and  adaptability  which  many 
animals  show  argues  well  for  their  intelligence.  Who 
is  there,  who  has  domesticated  various  sorts  of  wild 
beasts,  who  does  not  say  that  they  have  intelligence, 
and  form  and  execute  plans?  "  It  is  those  who  know 
them  best  who  have  the  firmest  conviction  on  this 
point." ' 

To  all  appearance,  the  si)ider's  web  is  as  much  a 
purpose  of  the  spider  as  the  web  of  the  weaver.  The 
squirrel  makes  his  winter  store,  and  man  preserves  his 
fruits.  The  beavers  build  houses  and  man  builds 
homes.  Do  not  the  beasts  foresee  and  display  purpos- 
iveness  as  well  as  man?  When  they  meet  unusual  or 
prohibitive  conditions,  do  they  not  show  great  intelli- 
gence in  circumventing  them,  in  finding  some  new  de- 
vice never  before  tried,  to  bring  about  the  same  re- 
sults, to  fulfil  the  same  purposes,  or  others  even  better 
adapted  to  new  wants? 

The  beasts  without  doubt  act  in  many  instances  with 
purpose,  and  display  in  their  acts  every  evidence  that 
their  acts  are  voluntary,  and  result  from  volitions  as 
their  cause,  and  that  the  end  for  which  they  are  work- 
ing is  known  and  perceived  ideally,  making  their  ac- 
tions and  the  effects  of  their  actions  purposive. 

But  while  a  great  part  of  these  actions  are  clearly 
purposive,  there  are  less  data  here  to  go  by  than  in  the 
case  of  men.  The  relative  number  of  acts  which  dis- 
play purpose  is  far  less,  while  a  new  type  of  activity 
displays  itself,  which  appears  truly  enough  and  unde- 
niably in  men,  but  is  much  more  in  evidence  in  the  beasts 
— instinct.    In  this  we  cannot  find  the  beast  planning, 

^  Janet :  Final  Causes. 

32 


THE    PURPOSES    OF   BEASTS 

purposing,  consciously  and  intelligently,  but  he  is  acting 
in  a  different  sort  of  way — indubitably  no  less  pur- 
posively;  but  now  the  purposes  cannot  so  easily  be  re- 
ferred to  the  conscious  and  voluntary  activity  of  the 
beast  himself.  This  is  natural,  for  the  degree  of  con- 
sciousness and  vohtional  power,  no  less  than  difference 
in  the  matter  of  the  reason,  is  marking  the  distinction 
between  men  and  beasts  by  which  the  former  hold 
their  superior  place  in  the  universe.  We  can  there- 
fore refer  the  pui-poses  which  we  may  find  in  instinct- 
ive actions  no  longer  to  the  consciousness  of  the  indi- 
vidual beast — internal  purposiveness — but  must  seek 
another  ground,  another  consciousness,  before  which  the 
purposes  are,  and  by  whose  volitional  activity  they  are, 
carried  into  effect. 

But  before  examining  this  subject,  instinct,  let  us 
look  for  a  moment  at  the  life  of  the  flora.  Here  we 
have,  so  far  as  we  are  able  to  determine,  none  of  the 
characteristics  of  the  mind.  There  is  life,  but  no  con- 
sciousness, volitional  activity  and  purposiveness.  This 
seems  to  stop  with  the  nervous  system.  We  see  some 
characteristics  that  appear  like  inner  and  consciously 
purposive  and  volitional  actions — the  long  journey  of 
a  young  sprout  under  a  stone  toward  the  light,  the 
turning  of  a  plant  toward  the  sun,  the  unaccustomed 
and  painful  efforts  of  the  cultivated  plants  to  propa- 
gate at  strange  seasons  when  they  have  been  thwarted 
in  their  first  attempt — these  look  almost  as  if  intended 
on  the  part  of  the  plant.  Yet  it  may  be  no  more  than 
that  which  is  a  common  property  of  all  life — the  "will 
to  live,"  or  the  working  out  of  another  will  through 
and  in  them.     We  cannot  determine  any  internal  pur- 

a3 


THE    CONCEPT    PURPOSE 

posiveness.  And  as  we  are  able  to  discover  in  the  ores, 
the  stones,  the  water,  the  air,  no  Ufe  at  all,  we  laugh 
to  scorn  those  imaginative  philosophers  who  have  tried 
to  establish  the  poetic  doctrine  of  philozoism.  If  there 
is  no  consciousness  in  a  rock,  there  is  likewise  no  hiter- 
nal  purposiveness,  as  a  purpose  must  be  present  before 
a  consciousness. 

Two  methods  of  explanation  have  stood  opposite 
each  other,  mutually  hostile — teleology  and  mechanism. 
The  former,  starting  from  man,  reasons  down,  apply- 
ing analogies  from  a  higher  order  to  a  lower.  The  lat- 
ter, beginning  with  matter,  argues  by  analogies  to 
higher  orders,  to  living  organisms,  to  rational  beings 
even,  and,  using  physical  and  mechanical  explanations, 
even  tries  to  reduce  the  volitional  and  reasoning  mind 
to  the  condition  of  a  brain  acting  by  reflexes  according 
to  the  laws  of  physics.  Schopenhauer  is  strikingly  at 
variance  with  his  usual  and  more  prominent  system  of 
idealism,  by  sudden  reversions  that  make  mind  and 
brain  identical  terms. 

We  have  shown  purposiveness  and  volitional  causa- 
tion to  exist  in  consciousness,  but  we  have  not  excluded 
but  rather  included  mechanical  causation.  In  the  inor- 
ganic sphere  we  have  for  the  present  excluded  internal 
conscious  volition.  As  we  have  brought  the  one  down, 
gradually  decreasing  and  disappearing,  so  as  we  go  up 
by  the  other  road  we  shall  see  the  mechanical  causation 
more  and  more  overcome,  overruled,  superseded  by  vo- 
litional activity,  which  represents  in  a  sense  a  higher 
force. 

Are  we  to  consider  that  physical  laws  and  mechan- 
ical operations  explain  themselves,  or  are  they  to  be 

3^5 


THE    PURPOSES    OF   BEASTS 

considered  valid  only  as  in  reference  to  some  ulterior 
ground?  Do  they  exclude  purposes  in  inorganic  na- 
ture, or  can  we  find  that  in  the  very  order  and  con- 
stitution of  the  mechanical  laws  themselves  there  is 
purpose  ? 


35 


CHAPTER  VI 

PURPOSE   IN   INORGANIC   NATURE 

There  are  comparatively  few  things  in  nature  that 
suggest  in  their  structure  direct  evidences  of  purposive- 
ness.  It  seems  possible  to  explain  most  things  suffi- 
ciently without  reference  to  this  concept.  But  we  can 
never  be  sure  that  this  is  not  due  to  our  own  short- 
sightedness, to  our  inability  to  judge  from  lack  of  suffi- 
cient data.  "  We  find  it  impossible  to  limit  anywhere 
the  conception  of  final  purpose  in  its  application  to 
the  concrete  facts  of  reality — anywhere,  that  is,  in  a 
logical  and  principled  way.  The  ignorance  of  man, 
which  is  either  partial  or  almost  complete  in  every  realm 
of  inquiry,  hmits  his  ability  to  recognize  the  particular 
final  purposes  served  by  the  concrete  facts  of  his  experi- 
ence. The  obscurity  which  hangs  like  an  impenetrable 
cloud  over  the  beginning  and  the  concluding  por- 
tions of  the  present  system  of  things  makes  it  impos- 
sible for  him  to  demonstrate  the  final  aim  of  the  world's 
course.  The  scale  of  rising  ideas  that  tower  one  above 
another  until  they  lose  themselves  in  the  heights  of 
the  loftiest  sesthetical  and  ethical  ideals  that  lie  one 
below  another  until  imagination  cannot  longer  conjec- 
ture the  ultimate  foundations  of  reality,  is  too  vast  for 
his  intuition  to  discern  surely  or  for  his  calculation  to 
measure   precisely.      But   wherever   man's   knowledge 

36 


PURPOSE    m    INORGANIC    NATURE 

does  go,  there  does  it  find  the  presence  indicated  of 
formative  principles  due  to  ideal  ends.  In  other  words, 
the  facts  of  purposiveness  seem  coextensive  with  the 
facts  of  knowledge.  All  things  and  all  minds  in  their 
structm-e,  development  and  relations,  give  token  of 
ideal  ends  to  our  cognitive  faculties.  And  without  the 
significant  influence  of  this  category  there  is  not  a 
thing  or  transaction  known  that  is  really  and  satisfac- 
torily known."  ^  "  In  the  construction  of  a  great  build- 
ing or  in  the  carrying  out  of  a  plan  of  campaign,  the 
subordinates  very  generally  work  in  accordance  with  a 
plan  not  revealed  to  them.  Their  whole  activity  is  gov- 
erned by  the  relation  of  means  and  ends;  but  they  remain 
in  ignorance,  for  the  relation  is  not  objectively  revealed 
until  the  work  converges  toward  completion.  To  one 
standing  in  the  midst  of  the  work,  and  especially  in  its 
raw  beginnings,  or  to  one  studying  the  details  singly 
and  not  in  their  relations,  the  end  may  well  be  missed 
altogether. 

*'  From  the  nature  of  the  case,  we  must  be  largely  in 
this  position  with  regard  to  the  purpose  in  nature.  Our 
own  brevity  makes  it  hard  to  believe  in  purpose  when 
it  is  slowly  realized."  ^  We  find  the  purposes  of  nature 
inscrutable,  and  are  unable  to  judge  as  we  judge  con- 
cerning the  purpose  manifested  in  the  boat  another 
builds,  to  which  we  have  only  an  exterior  relation.  Just 
so  a  cat  would  regard  a  printing-press  as  a  place  well 
fitted  for  hunting  and  hiding,  but  nothing  further. 
But  if  we  consider  purpose  as  a  fact  in  nature,  then  we 
are  enabled  to  bring  our  thought  to  a  systematic  com- 

^  Ladd  :  A  Theory  of  Reality. 

^  Bowne  :  Theory  of  Thought  and  Knowledge. 

37 


THE    CONCEPT    PURPOSE 

pleteness,  and  our  reasonings  are  not  doomed  to  end  in 
a  deadlock.  In  this  there  is  nothing  that  is  "  contrary 
to  the  laws  of  reason,  logic  or  analogy."  There  is  no 
reason  why  the  law  of  cause  and  effect  should  not  be 
found  in  every  set  of  phenomena  that  comes  under  ob- 
servation, from  stones  to  om'  own  mind.  Even  thinking 
and  willing  have  some  sort  of  a  causal  inter-connection. 
Why  not  find  the  opposite  point  of  view  true,  too,  that 
purposes  are  to  be  found  everywhere,  that  nature  is 
purposive?  Why  should  a  mechanical  explanation  try 
to  rout  a  supposed  enemy  when,  if  we  are  in  search  of 
an  explanation,  we  should  entertam  both  guests  under 
the  same  roof  as  friends?  The  mechanical  explanation, 
carried  to  extreme,  is  absurd.  It  will  deny  the  intelli- 
gence of  other  men,  and  of  one's  self,  and  end  in  com- 
plete speculative  collapse.  Mechanical  causality  ends 
by  cancelling  itself  through  the  impossibility  of  think- 
ing it  in  infinite  regress,  and  leaves  the  insoluble  prob- 
lem that  is  found  so  clearly  stated  in  Schopenhauer's 
"  Fourfold  Root  of  the  Principle  of  Sufficient  Rea- 
son." Causality  must  originate  in  the  first  member  of 
a  causal  series,  and  arises  from  the  concept  of  the  Indi- 
vidual, inasmuch  as  each  individual  is  characterized  by 
its  degree,  and  differences  of  degree  result  in  Causa- 
tion. So,  instead  of  there  being  no  first  cause,  there 
are  many  first  causes.  And  volitional  causalitj^  is  the 
one  fundamental,  basal  causality  both  in  men's  minds 
and  in  the  evolution  of  nature ;  and  mechanical  causality 
must  be  shown  to  be  a  form,  an  aspect,  a  manifestation 
of  volitional  causality,  and  must  be  thus  understood,  if 
our  thinking  is  to  be  order  and  not  chaos.  Purpose 
cannot  be  excluded  from  mechanical  causality  "  miless 

38 


PURPOSE    IN    INORGANIC    NATURE 

it  be  shown  that  the  mechanism  cannot  be  viewed  as 
founded  in  or  directed  by  inteUigence."  ^ 

On  the  other  hand,  teleological  explanation,  if  car- 
ried to  excess,  is  liable  to  abuse,  and  is  at  best  impossible 
of  sufficient  proof  in  the  present  state  of  our  knowledge. 
All  we  wish  to  attempt  at  present  is  to  show  that  the 
constitution  of  things  would  lead  us  to  the  inference 
that  there  is,  as  the  explanation  and  ground  of  the  world, 
a  mind  which  unites  intellectual  and  volitional  (pur- 
posive) activities  in  one  intelligence. 

It  is  not  difficult  to  see  the  internal  purposive  nature 
of  organic  beings,  for,  as  individuals,  they  exist  for 
themselves,  to  fulfil  their  proper  functions.     Self-pres- 
ervation is  their  first  law  of  life.     They  may  also  have  a 
value  as  related  to  other  things,  but  this  is  not  necessary 
to  give  them  the  characteristic  of  purposiveness.    But  in 
the  case  of  inorganic  beings,  we  cannot  discover  any  in- 
terior purposiveness  or  volitional  activity  at  all.    Hence, 
we  must  look  at  them  as  they  are  related  to  other  things. 
And  we  first  look  at  them  as  related  to  living  nature. 
Instead  of  studying  single  individual  objects  or  species 
now,  we  must  take  nature  as  a  whole,  and  treat  it  as 
an  organism,  organum.     In  other  words,  there  is  "  the 
respective  and  reciprocal  utility  of  one  and  the  same 
being  for  each  other,  and  of  all  for  the  whole  being." 
And  as  an  organism  we  may  see  evidences  of  purposive- 
ness.    First,  let  us  see  what  indications  there  are  for 
all  external  purposiveness.     We  need  not  here  expect 
to  find  purposes  present  to  the  consciousnesses  of  the 
various  things  by  which  and  in  which  the  purposes  are 
displayed  in  process  of  being  realized,  or  already  real- 

1  Bowne  :  Theory  of  Thought  and  KnoA\  ledge. 

39 


THi;   CONCEPT    PURPOSE 

ized.  Stones  have  no  consciousness  that  we  are  able  to 
determine.  And  this  is  why  we  have  drawn  the  distinc- 
tion between  internal  and  external  purposiveness.  But 
we  have  defined  purpose  in  our  analysis  of  it  as  being 
"  present  before  a  consciousness"  This  definition  is 
still  to  hold  good,  and  the  sheer  force  of  logic  compels 
us  to  carry  with  the  definition  the  implications  involved 
in  this  definition  of  Purpose. 

Therefore,  the  purposes  of  both  inorganic  and  or- 
ganic nature  must  be  referred  to  a  thinking  and  willing 
mind  before  the  consciousness  of  which  the  purposive- 
ness is  present,  and  in  whose  plans  the  purposes  are  ad- 
vancing toward  a  consummation,  in  reality  at  least,  when 
the  ideal  shall  become  the  real.  It  is  in  this  way  that 
the  imiverse  comes  to  have  an  external  purposiveness. 

We  now  find  ourselves  considerably  at  variance 
with  the  position  of  Kant,^  who  was  so  engrossed  in 
tracing  the  internal  purposiveness  that  he  sacrificed  too 
much  the  external  purposes.  Our  position — the  uni- 
verse as  an  organum — shows  internal  and  external  pur- 
poses to  be  bound  up  inseparably  together.  Each  unit 
of  the  great  mass  exists  only  as  it  depends  on  others, 
yes,  even  all  the  others,  for  its  means  of  support.  Each 
thing  that  we  may  mention  depends  upon  every  other 
thing  of  its  own  class,  or  beneath  it ;  and  the  lower  orders 
exist  not  only  for  themselves  and  as  the  support  of  the 
higher,  but  are  often  much  benefited  by  the  existence 
of  the  higher  forms.  The  flora  are  food  for  the  fauna, 
the  fauna  in  their  turn  keep  in  restriction  a  too  exu- 
berant growth.  The  different  varieties  keep  among 
themselves  a  wonderful  balance,  so  that  one  sort  of  beast 

^  Kant  :  Critique  of  Judgment. 

40 


PURPOSE    IN    INORGANIC    NATURE 

does  not  overrun  and  destroy  all  the  others.  And  man 
improves  the  condition  of  both,  as  well  as  utiHzing 
them. 

We  often  find  in  this  miiverse,  which  is  arranged 
with  all  the  symmetry  of  an  ordered  series,  that  there 
are  accidents  or  variations  that  cannot  be  accounted  for. 
But  the  application  of  purposes  need  not  deny  the  ex- 
istence of  such.  The  observation  of  such  exceptions 
seems  very  often  to  cast  doubt  on  the  whole.  But  a 
moment's  consideration  will  show  why,  although  some 
things  in  nature  may  at  first  sight  appear  to  be  fortui- 
tous, the  whole  ultimately  cannot  be  so,  but  is  none  the 
less  the  embodiment  of  purpose. 

Indeed,  how  do  we  discover,  determine  the  laws  of 
nature? 

The  law  with  which  men  first  concerned  themselves 
was  social  law,  which  soon  crystallized  into  a  set  form 
called  civil  law.  How  did  this  arise?  Men  observed 
the  relations  that  existed  among  them,  their  respective 
rights  and  mutual  privileges,  and  they  generalized  these 
into  social  rules,  which  grew  as  they  were  extended  to 
a  greater  number  into  the  civil  law.  So  civil  laws  are 
the  generalizations  of  the  rights  and  experiences  of 
many  men.  They  represent  the  average  of  the  men  to 
whom  they  apply,  not  an  impractical  ideal  nor  a  low 
standard  that  would  induce  revolt. 

Do  these  laws  apply  to  every  case  that  comes  under 
their  ruling?  No.  There  is  many  an  exception.  And 
so  there  is  established  the  Court  of  Equity,  to  make 
right  that  for  which  the  law  was  not  framed,  or  for  cases 
where  the  application  of  the  law  would  be  unjust  and 
the  reversal  of  it  just.     And  so  the  civil  law  is  a  gen- 

41 


THE    CONCEPT   PURPOSE 

eralization,  a  norm,  a  standard,  to  which  most  men  de- 
sire to  conform,  and  which  is  formulated  as  a  means  by 
which  the  few  may  be  compelled  to  conform. 

Is  it  otherwise  with  physical  or  natural  law?  Let 
us  take  two  instances: 

According  to  the  law  of  probabihty,  if  a  coin  is 
tossed  into  the  air,  whirling,  the  chance  that  it  will  come 
up  heads  is  even  with  that  of  tails.  The  ratio  is  1  : 1. 
If  it  is  flipped  up  a  hundred  times,  the  chances  are 
again  even,  and  the  probability  is  that  it  will  come  fifty 
times  heads,  and  fifty  times  tails.  If  a  thousand,  the 
ratio  is  500  :  500.  Such  is  the  law  obtained  by  general- 
ization. How  does  an  experiment  show  it?  There  is 
an  approximation  to  this  generalization,  this  even  per- 
centage, but  there  is  no  necessity  that  there  should  be 
an  exact  conformity.  Experiment  might  lay  down 
certain  limits  outside  of  which  it  has  never  come  and 
might  never  come.  But  there  is  always  the  chance  that 
there  will  not  be  an  exact  conformity  to  law,  even  when 
running  to  the  highest  numbers.  The  most  we  can  say 
is,  that  there  is  an  approximation  to  the  law.  Here  is 
a  table  showing  an  actual  experiment: 


too        200      500       4-00        500      600       700        flOO      900     lOOO 


Tossing  a  hundred  times  a  day  for  ten  days,  a  thousand 
tosses,  gave  heads  the  first  time,  then  sank  to  three  tails 
in  excess  of  the  average  at  the  end  of  the  day.  At 
the  end  of  the  third  day  there  were  nine  tails  above  the 

42 


PURPOSE    IN   INORGANIC    NATURE 

average.  Then  began  a  steady  rise  in  the  number  of 
heads,  till  at  the  end  of  the  sixth  day,  there  were  ten 
more  heads  than  tails.  At  the  end  of  the  tenth  day 
there  were  two  more  heads  than  tails  in  the  thousand 
throws. 

The  curve  that  a  cannon  ball  will  take  when  fired 
at  an  angle  of  forty-five  degrees,  the  curve  of  the 
parabola,  has  been  figured  out  mathematically.  But  ex- 
periments show  a  great  deal  of  variation  from  the  line 


mathematically  determined.  The  ball  may  take  a  curve 
higher  than  the  law  requires,  lower,  or  to  either  side, 
although  the  gun  remains  in  exactly  the  same  position 
and  at  the  same  angle. 

This  has  also  been  tried  on  a  small  scale,  where  for- 
eign influences  could  be  guarded  against,  with  the  same 
results. 

The  same  thing  is  true  regarding  a  falling  body.  It 
deviates  from  the  perpendicular,  which  the  law  of  grav- 
ity requires,  to  some  extent.  Of  course  this  is  within 
limits.  The  falling  body  does  not  fall  sideways,  at  an 
angle  of  ninety  degrees.  But  the  deviation  is  sufficient 
to  cause  a  variation  from  the  strict  statement  of  the 
law  of  gravitation.  These  laws,  based  on  generaliza- 
tions, are  primarily  obtained  by  observations.  The  gen- 
eralization laid  down  is  a  strict,  hard  and  fast  law. 

43 


THE    CONCEPT    PURPOSE 

When  put  to  the  test  of  experience,  it  is  found  that  in 
ahnost  every  case  there  is  exception  to  a  shght  degree, 
enough  to  admit  other  causes,  new  causal  series,  means, 
and  diverse  ultimate  results.  In  fact,  this  is  one  way 
by  which  many  modern  philosophers  introduce  the  con- 
cept purpose,  basing  it  on  Chance.  Because  there  is 
chance  there  can  enter  purposive  action,  which  goes  to 
some  degree  contrary  to  the  laws.  But  this  view  is  based 
on  the  assumption  that  the  laws  are  of  themselves  active 
and  act  blindly,  mechanically,  unguided,  and  that  in  the 
sphere  where  they  are  operative,  there  is  no  possibility 
of  purposiveness.  It  is  only  by  "  getting  in  by  a  side 
door  "  that  there  is  to  be  made  a  place  for  purpose. 

But  let  us  turn  the  picture  another  way.  It  is  not 
because  of  these  deviations,  but  in  spite  of  them,  that 
purposes  are  operative.  The  very  fact  that  a  general- 
ization of  observations  can  be  made  means  that  nature, 
on  the  whole,  acts  conformably  to  a  certain  definite  di- 
rection. The  laws  are  frequently  broken  or  overcome. 
The  growth  of  a  tree  overcomes  gravitation,  the  wind 
moves  a  flying  projectile  from  its  path,  and  man  is 
constantly  using  one  force  of  nature  to  overcome  an- 
other. The  deviation  from  a  strict  conformity  to  law 
permits  the  entrance  and  activity  of  another  kind  of 
cause,  i.  e.,  that  arising  from  an  outside  source,  of  which 
the  best  example  is  the  volitional  causality. 

The  activity  of  man  makes  many  exceptions  to  law. 
He  wilfully  goes  contrary  to  the  moral  law,  and  makes 
an  exception  to  law  and  a  deviation  in  the  course  of 
events.  He  alters  events  in  the  physical  world,  thereby 
causing  deviation  or  change  in  the  obedience  of  things 
to  physical  laws,  as  when  he  erects  a  mound  of  stones. 

44 


PURPOSE    IN    INORGANIC    NATURE 

The  beavers  obstruct  the  flow  of  the  stream,  and  heap 
up  a  dam  and  a  pile  of  water  of  great  weight.  The 
growing  tree  displaces  or  splits  a  rock.  All  these  form 
exceptions  to  one  or  other  of  the  physical  laws.  And 
yet  the  whole  of  nature  advances  in  its  course  of  evo- 
lution, fulfilling  its  purpose,  tending  toward  the  realiza- 
tion of  its  ideal.  We  here  find  one  purpose  overcoming 
the  fulfillment  of  another,  and  yet  the  whole  is  carrying 
out  a  purpose  which  unites  and  blends  all  the  others. 
Actions  and  reactions  without  end  would  never  result 
in  a  purpose  were  there  not  a  consciousness  to  which  it 
must  be  referred. 

Take  two  contiguous  moments  of  time.  Given  the 
world  as  it  was  a  moment  ago,  the  last  moment  of  the 
past.  Suppose  all  to  depend  on  chance.  There  is  but 
one  chance  that  at  this  present  moment  the  world  will 
be  as  it  is  now.  There  is  but  the  one  chance  that  it 
will  continue  from  the  first  to  the  second  moment.  And 
these  against  a  countless  infinity  of  chances  that  it  will 
be  otherwise.  And  to  be  otherwise  means  what?  There 
is  but  one  chance  that  the  world  will  continue  the  next 
moment.  If  it  does,  then  that  means  what?  That 
there  are  innumerable  chances  to  one  that  the  world 
will  not  exist  the  next  moment,  that  it  will  vanish  and 
disappear  rather  than  continue,  for  to  upset  its  laws 
and  destroy  its  development  and  reverse  its  evolution 
means  destruction.  And  there  is  every  chance  against 
one  for  this.  But  it  is  the  chance  that  we  have  found 
to  happen,  from  which  we  recognize  the  force  of  the 
consciousness  and  of  the  volition  by  which  the  evolution 
and  realization  of  the  purpose  is  maintained  and  ad- 
vanced.     We  attribute  an  intelligence  and  choice  to 

45 


THE    CONCEPT   PURPOSE 

that  mind  which  sustains  all  nature  in  existence.  The 
purposiveness  that  carries  forward  the  evolution  and 
growth  of  the  world  is  the  evidence  of  that  great  ideal 
which  the  world  is  ever  tending  to  realize. 

"  Facts  of  the  sort  which  the  theory  of  evolution 
pursues  cannot  be  known  at  all  otherwise  than  in  their 
relation  to  some  teleological  conception.  The  meaning 
of  the  entire  series  of  facts,  as  actually  arranged  and 
viewed  in  the  light  of  the  ideal  ends  to  be  secured,  is 
essential  to  the  knowledge  of  the  facts  themselves."  ^ 

Let  us  return  once  more  to  our  illustration  from 
civil  law.  The  laws  alone  are  dead,  inactive,  inefficient. 
They  have  no  power  to  purpose,  although  they  exhibit 
in  their  construction  purposiveness.  They  imply  two 
things — a  legislative  as  their  source,  and  an  executive 
as  the  power  which  makes  them  valid  and  active,  which 
puts  them  in  operation.  These  two  things,  or  parts  of 
the  one  thing,  an  administrative  government,  are  shown 
by  the  very  structure  of  the  laws  themselves.  The  laws 
of  nature  are  generalizations  arising  from  the  observa- 
tion of  the  relations  that  exist  among  the  properties  of 
the  bodies  of  nature.  These  again  witness  in  their  verj^ 
nature  (first,  the  operation  of  the  mind  of  man  in 
forming  these  generalizations;  then,  if,  apart  from  the 
mind  of  men,  they  have  any  validity,  as  we  are  forced 
to  conclude  that  they  have)  the  existence  back  of  them, 
in  and  through  them,  of  a  purposive  Being  who  is  both 
legislating  power  and  executive  force,  else  the  laws 
would  be  ineffective  and  no  more  than  unexecuted  plans 
that  never  see  the  light  of  reality. 

Thus  we  conclude  that  the  world  is  affected  by  an- 

^  Ladd  :  A  Theory  of  Reality. 
46 


PURPOSE    IN    INORGANIC    NATURE 

other  series  of  causes  other  than  merely  mechanical.  It 
has  been  mider  the  guidance,  both  outside  and  inside  of 
it,  of  a  volitional  and  causal  activity  which  has  the  power 
of  foraiing  and  executing  purposes.  And  that  cause  is 
intelligent,  mental,  voUtional.  And  the  will-causation 
controls  and  directs  the  mechanical  causation.  Thus  all 
order  implies  and  expresses  purposiveness. 

And  even  the  mechanical  laws  themselves — are  they 
independent,  self-sufficient,  self-acting  machines  whose 
whole  ground  and  explanation  is  to  be  found  in  them- 
selves? Or  do  they  also  give  evidences  of  purpose,  and 
another  ulterior  power  behind  them?  Is  it  not  a  legit- 
imate question  to  ask,  whence  come  these  mechanical 
laws?  What  is  logic  and  logical  necessity  but  the  laws 
of  thought,  the  way  in  which  the  mind  thinks?  Is  the 
nature  of  the  mind  due  to  the  mind  itself — to  its  internal 
purposiveness;  or  is  it  due  to  an  external  purposiveness 
of  which  the  minds  of  men  form  but  one  of  the  more 
important  means — the  purposiveness  of  nature,  perhaps 
— to  whom  the  mechanical  laws  and  the  conditions  un- 
der which  they  act  are  also  means?  Do  not  law  and 
order  in  the  universe  point  to  a  purpose  to  be  realized 
by  these  means,  and  this  purposiveness,  to  a  conscious- 
ness as  its  ground? 

Schelling  says:  "  The  peculiarity  of  nature  rests  on 
the  fact  that,  with  all  its  mechanism,  it  is  yet  full  of 
purpose."  Indeed,  our  very  use  of  the  term  "  Mechan- 
ism "  with  reference  to  the  laws  of  nature  indicates  that 
we  have  in  our  minds  the  machines  which  men  make 
with  purpose,  and  which  are  means  by  which  we  exe- 
cute our  purposes. 

"  The  conception  of  mechanism  cannot  be  held,  even 

47 


THE    CONCEPT    PURPOSE 

its  most  meagre  and  outline  form  of  statement,  without 
implying  the  conception  of  final  purpose.  And  the 
most  elaborate  and  comprehensive  form  of  the  mechan- 
ical theory — the  modern  scientific  and  all-inclusive 
theory  of  evolution — does  not  at  all  dispense  with,  but 
rather  enhances  and  applies  in  multiform  ways,  the 
ideas  of  teleology."  "  Mechanism  means  nothing  less 
than  this:  a  system  of  individual  existences  which  act 
and  react  upon  one  another,  according  to  forms  and  in 
obedience  to  laws  that  are  necessary  to  the  attainment 
of  ideal  ends.  No  such  conception  as  a  '  mechanism  of 
nature  '  or  a  '  structure  of  the  world  '  is  tenable  without 
the  implicate  of  purposiveness.  A  critical  metaphysics 
has  therefore  no  need  to  effect  a  union,  or  apologetically 
to  harmonize  a  seeming  conflict  between  these  two  prin- 
ciples. The  two  are  in  union,  essentially  one  and  the 
same,  both  as  noetical  and  as  ontological  principles. 
.  .  .  To  talk  of  conflict  here  is  foolishness;  to  at- 
tempt reconciliation  there  is  no  need."  ^ 

^  Ladd  :   A  Theory  ot  Reality. 


48 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE   PURPOSE   OF   ORGANIC   NATURE 

In  our  former  consideration  of  the  beasts,  we  noticed 
only  one  set  of  phenomena,  from  which  we  concluded 
their  intelligence  and  their  internal  purposiveness.  It 
is  now  necessary  to  consider  them  as  related  to  the  rest 
of  the  universe,  as  parts  of  the  organum  and  as  reveal- 
ing external  purposiveness.  The  classifications  of 
zoology  are  based  not  on  the  use  of  parts,  but  on  the 
design,  the  purpose,  of  the  beast.  It  is  a  division  into 
types.  The  instincts  of  animals  are  not  the  result  of 
imitation  and  experience.  They  appear  not  to  be 
planned  by  the  beast.  They  do  not  indicate  conscious- 
ness of  purposes.  While  modified  by  experience,  they 
do  not  depend  on  it.  The  actions  of  the  newly  matured 
bee  in  seeking  honey  and  returning  to  the  hive ;  the  adap- 
tation of  a  moth  to  its  new  Ufe,  so  unlike  its  hfe  as  a 
caterpillar,  and  her  provision  for  food  for  the  children 
she  has  never  seen;  the  harvesting  and  storing  of  nuts 
by  an  old  squirrel  who  had  been  born  and  raised  in  cap- 
tivity and  who  had  never  experienced  a  winter  out  of 
doors  until  escape  from  confinement,  all  show  these  in- 
nate capacities  which  are  so  necessary  to  the  preserva- 
tion of  the  species.  If  these  plans  that  are  formed  and 
purposes  that  are  executed  cannot  be  referred  to  the 
conscious  activity  of  the  beast,  they  must  be  referred 
to  some  other  consciousness  superior  to  the  conditions 
and  environments  in  which  they  are  placed.     They  de- 

49 


THE    CONCEPT    PURPOSE 

pend  on  their  instincts  of  preservation,  perpetuation, 
and  their  cooperative  instincts  (beavers,  ants,  bees)  for 
the  accomphshment  of  their  functions.  In  all  instincts 
there  is  an  adaptation  of  the  beast  to  the  satisfaction  of 
its  wants.  It  fulfils  purposes  which  are  imposed  upon 
it  from  outside.  It  is  conditioned.  The  beast  is  carry- 
ing out  plans  and  fulfilling  its  functions  in  the  world, 
and  it  must  continue  in  that  course.  It  cannot  tran- 
scend its  limits.  Both  upon  insentient  and  sentient  life 
there  is  imposed  the  mark  of  a  purpose  which  is  not  of 
their  own  making,  but  which  they  are  constrained  to 
carry  out.  And  even  so  with  man,  while  he  can  use 
the  lower  laws  and  profit  by  mechanical  causation,  can 
chain  the  powers  of  water,  steam  and  electricity  and 
adapt  them  to  his  own  designs  and  make  them  execute 
his  own  purposes,  while — greatest  of  all — he  can  plan 
while  many  other  intelligent  and  purposeful  men  come 
under  his  plan  and  often  bhndly  execute  his  purposes, 
being  thereby  conditioned  by  his  thought,  yet  he,  too, 
is  conditioned.  He  is  within  hmits.  There  is  a  limit 
to  his  power  of  conception  and  volition,  and  a  still  closer 
limit  to  his  ability  to  execute  his  purposes.  He  is  not 
alone  compelled  to  work  in  accordance  with  mechanical 
causation,  and  not  against  it;  he  is  also  conditioned  by 
the  purpose  which  is  imposed  upon  the  universe  and 
upon  him  as  its  noblest  representative,  from  a  foreign 
source,  and  he  must  fulfil  his  function,  his  part,  in 
bringing  to  a  realization  in  fact,  the  purpose  which  is 
everywhere  evident.  Indeed,  unless  the  universe  were 
rationally,  purposively,  consciously,  even  *'  Divinely 
constituted,  it  could  not  be  reasoned  about."  ^ 

"  But  though  there  are  some  things  which  convince 

^  Frazer. 
50 


THE  PURPOSE  OF  ORGANIC  NATURE 

us  human  agents  are  concerned  in  producing  them,  yet 
it  is  evident  to  every  one  that  these  things  which  are 
called  the  works  of  nature  are  not  produced  by  or  de- 
pendent on  the  wills  of  men."  ^ 

The  external  world,  as  given  to  us  in  experience,  is 
an  ordered,  necessarily  connected  series.  We  find  the 
external  world  a  purposive  order,  and  consequently  de- 
termine it  to  be  consciously  constituted. 

"  It  is  because  there  is  an  industry  of  nature,  a  ge- 
ometry, and  aesthetic  of  nature,  that  man  is  capable  of 
industry,  of  geometry  and  aesthetic.  Nature  is  all  that 
we  are,  and  all  that  we  are  we  hold  from  nature.  The 
creative  genius  which  the  artist  feels  in  himself  is  to 
him  the  revelation  and  the  symbol  of  the  creative  genius 
of  nature."  ^ 

This  leads  us  to  the  position  that  there  is,  above  the 
physical  laws  of  the  world,  a  higher  law,  a  mental  caus- 
ality, a  conscious  purpose,  a  spiritual  and  Divine  guid- 
ance. The  laws  of  nature,  as  being  of  a  lower  order, 
the  lower  of  a  pair  of  parallel  horizontal  lines,  are 
altered,  changed,  alFected,  given  validity  and  purposive- 
ness  by  a  higher  law,  which  dominates  it  and  overrules  it, 
usually  unnoticed,  but  sometimes  in  a  manner  unusual, 
as  are  those  events  which,  not  being  easily  explained,  we 
call  miraculous,  or  wonderful,  or  strange. 

We  see  here  a  causal  activity  working  from  the 

upper  line  upon  the  lower, 

a 

i 
h 

(and  yet  we  cannot  consider  this  more  than  a  very  super- 
ficial illustration). 

^  Berkeley,  Principles,  §  146.  *  Janet :  Final  Causes. 

51 


THE    CONCEPT    PURPOSE 

If  the  lower  line  indicates  the  series  of  events  in 
the  world,  and  the  upper  the  conscious,  volitional, 
thinking  intelligence,  to  which  we  have  referred  the 
purposiveness  that  we  have  observed  in  the  lower  line, 
as  to  a  cause  or  ground,  we  find  this  true  in  one  sense. 

Yet  the  illustration  shows  two  lines  which  are  every- 
where equally  distant,  although  infinitely  prolonged. 
This  is  when  our  view  is  restricted  to  a  very  limited  por- 
tion of  the  lines. 

But  purpose  in  the  universe  is  not  only  an  exterior 
purposiveness,  due  to  a  consciousness  independent  of 
the  world  and  yet  acting  upon  it,  but  also  to  an  internal 
purposiveness  due  to  a  "  Weltgheist,"  or  to  an  immanent 
Consciousness.  Let  us  use  our  illustration  of  the  par- 
allel lines  again.  If  we  view  them  from  a  distance, 
they  seem  to  approach  so  closely  together  that  they  ap- 
pear identical.  ( Or  they  may  be  considered  as  meeting 
in  infinity,  or  as  crossing,  if  we  introduce  other  consid- 
erations not  yet  entertained,  like  a  fourth  dimension,  for 
instance. )  The  first  use  of  the  lines  illustrates  the  tran- 
scendence, the  second  the  immanence  of  God.  But  here 
there  is  intended  no  contradiction.  In  distinction  from 
the  German  philosophers,  we  do  not  consider  transcend- 
ence and  immanence  as  mutually  exclusive.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  there  is  no  instance  in  the  history  of 
philosophy  where  one  excludes  the  other.  Descartes' 
"  divinus  concursus "  and  Leibnitz'  "  continued  cre- 
ation "  both  imply  immanence.  Spinoza's  "  Natura  Nat- 
urans  "  and  Hegel's  "  Idea  and  Natm'e  "  imply  tran- 
scendence. All  transcendence  shows  a  relation  be- 
tween God  and  the  world,  and  hence  immanence,  else 
the  separation  between  God  and  the  world,  being  com- 

52 


THE    PURPOSE    OF    ORGANIC    NATURE 

plete,  would  prevent  the  knowledge  of  either  by  the 
other.  And  all  immanence  shows  a  distinction,  a  du- 
ahty,  between  God  and  the  world,  and  hence  transcend- 
ence, else  the  identity  would  result  in  a  fixity,  an 
unchangeableness,  where  there  could  be  no  cause  and 
effect,  no  relative  and  absolute. 

We  may  illustrate  the  union  of  transcendence  and 
immanence  by  reference  to  the  relation  existing  between 
a  man's  mind  and  his  body.  Our  mind  is  not  our  body. 
To  us,  body,  nerves,  brain,  are  all  objective.  And 
again  we  can  in  self -consciousness  objectify  ourselves 
still  more;  ourselves  as  subjects  are  not  ourselves  as 
objects.     The  immaterial  mind  transcends  the  body. 

Again,  the  mind  is  immanent  in  the  body,  because 
it  is  through  the  brain  and  nervous  system  that  it  acts 
and  manifests  itself.  It  is  the  life  of  the  body,  and 
displays  itself  in  expression  of  face  and  in  character, 
and  pervades  all  the  work  which  it  accomplishes. 

These  two  relations  are  logically  distinct,  but  are 
actually  one.  The  dead  body  differs  from  the  living 
because  the  mind  is  not  active  in  it.  And  we  have  no 
immediate  and  direct  knowledge  of  a  mind  apart  from 
a  body,  although  it  transcends  the  body  in  its  self-con- 
scious, self -identical  and  self-determined  characteristics. 

The  union  of  the  two  parallel  lines  of  our  former 
illustration. 


a. 
h 


is  to  be  discovered  and  found  in  the  concrete  expressions 
in  reality  of  the  concept  purpose  which,  like  the  fourth 

53 


THE    CONCEPT    PURPOSE 

dimension,  links  the  minds  and  the  works  of  men  in  a 
reciprocal  relation,  and  in  the  same  manner  unites  God 
and  the  world.  The  supreme  cause  is  at  once  apart  from 
and  within  nature.  The  purposes  of  God  are  worked 
out  both  upon  nature  by  external  purposiveness  and 
within  nature  by  internal  pui'posiveness,  and  it  is  fre- 
quently impossible  to  determine  to  which  class  the  evi- 
dences of  a  purpose  belong. 

And  besides,  all  the  secondary  purposes  are  being 
realized  in  the  world;  in  this  conception  of  the  parallel 
lines,  all  are  linked  and  united  into  one  great,  purposive 
whole.  Nature  is  the  working  out  and  the  evidence  of  a 
purpose  of  God  of  which  it  is  the  gradually  developing 
realization.  ^ 

"An  '  ultimate  '  purpose  of  the  world's  being  and 
course,  as  such,  may  well  seem  something  unattainable 
and  even  inconceivable.  The  end  to  be  attained  can- 
not be  regarded  as  the  complete  cessation  of  the  process 
of  its  own  attainment.  The  ultimate  purpose  of  Na- 
ture cannot  be  a  statical  condition.  The  very  idea  of 
teleology  is  an  incitement  to  strive  on  and  live  on;  the 
idea  itself  perishes  in  its  own  completed  realization.  To 
be  sure,  individual  men  get  tired  and  come  to  consider 
Nirvana  as  the  ultimate  ideal;  or  they  get  pessimistic 
and  regard  the  condition  when  the  world  shall  be  a 
burned-out  coal  as  something  devoutly  to  be  wished. 
But  the  world  itself  is  not  tired ;  and  the  strictly  '  ulti- 
mate '  purpose  is  always  beyond  where  man's  hope  and 
faith — not  to  say  man's  knowledge — can  go.  .  .  . 
This  world  is,  fundamentally  considered,  known  to 
man  as  a  Will  guided  by  immanent  ideas;  and  among 
these  guiding  ideas  are  the  ideal  ends,  already  actually 

54i 


THE  PURPOSE  OF  ORGANIC  NATURE 

secured    and    to    be    secured    by    the    action    of    this 
WiU." ' 

And  thus  man  forms  the  conception  of  the  Imma- 
nent God. 

And  so,  as  the  transcendent  God  and  the  immanent 
God  are  one,  the  external  purpose  and  the  internal  pur- 
pose of  the  world  are  united  into  One  Purpose,  which 
is  the  manifestation  of  the  Will  of  God,  expressing  and 
realizing  His  Ideas,  and  the  "  ultimate  purpose  "  of  the 
universe  is  present  before  the  Consciousness  of  God. 
^  Ladd  :  A  Theory  of  Reality. 


55 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


Berkeley  :  Dialogues ;  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge ;  Theory  of 
Vision. 

BowNE  :  Theory  of  Thought  and  Knowledge. 

Butler  :  Analogy. 

Descartes  :  Discourse  on  Method  ;  Meditations  ;  Principles  of  Philoso- 
phy- 

Dewey  :  Psychology. 

FiCHTE :  Wissenschaftslehre. 

Haeckel  :  The  Riddle  of  the  Universe. 

Hartmann  :  Philosophie  des  Unbewussten. 

Hegel  :  Logic. 

Hume  :  Treatise  of  Human  Nature ;  Enquiry  Concerning  Human 
Understanding. 

Illingworth  :  Personality  ;  Immanence. 

James  :  Psychology.     (Two  volumes,  and  briefer  course.) 

Kant  :  Prolegomena  ;  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  ;  Critique  of  Practical 
Reason  ;  Critique  of  Judgment. 

Ladd  :  Philosophy  of  Mind ;  Outlines  of  Descriptive  Psychology ;  A 
Theory  of  Reality. 

Lange  :  History  of  Materialism. 

Locke  :  Essay  Concerning  Human  Understanding. 

Milne-Edwards  :  Zoologie. 

MuNSTERBERG  :  Grundziige  der  Psychologie. 

Orr  :  God  and  the  World. 

Paulsen  :  Introduction  to  Philosophy. 

PiERSoN  :  Grammar  of  Science. 

Reaumer  :  Hist,  des  Insectes. 

RiBOT :  Diseases  of  the  Will. 

Royce  :  Spirit  of  Modern  Philosophy ;  The  World  and  the  Individual. 

56 


*  «       • 

•  •    • 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Schopenhauer  :  Fourfold  Root ;  Will  in  Nature ;  The  World  as  Will 

and  Idea. 
Spinoza  :  Theo.-Pol.   Treatise  ;    Political  Treatise ;    Improvement   of 

the  Understanding  ;  Ethics. 
Stout  :  Manual  of  Psychology. 
Ward:   Materialism  and  Agnosticism. 
WooDBRiDGE  :  The  Problem  of  Metaphysics.     (Philosophical  Reviewj 

vol.  xii..  No.  4,  July^  1903.) 


57 


o^:v- 


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